http://hdl.handle.net/10174/14329 Fri, 31 Jul 2026 05:29:08 GMT 2026-07-31T05:29:08Z http://hdl.handle.net/10174/39607 Title: Game Theoretical Aspects Towards a Sustainable Path to Fight Climate Change Authors: Rocha de Sousa, Miguel Abstract: We provide a new form of re-globalization tackling the aspects of climate change by addressing it through a theoretical approach rooted in game theory. A first holistic game of Berlin—between the individual and the group—is presented, grounded in Isaiah Berlin’s (Berlin (1961)) concepts of negative and positive liberty. Next, we generalize a non-cooperative game of climate change. Building on an evolutionary game theory approach (Caleiro et al., 2019), we propose a novel framework. We then explore cooperative games and introduce the notion of Kantian equilibrium as developed by Roemer (2019). Finally, we discuss the intertemporal politicaleconomic approach to climate change in the context of an overlapping generations (OLG) model, as in Rocha de Sousa and Pica (2023). We conclude with conjectures on global climate governance, drawing from simulations of global ecological footprints (Araújo et al., 2025). Mon, 30 Jun 2025 23:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10174/39607 2025-06-30T23:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37128 Title: An OLG model approach to climate change with intergenerational concern and Game Theory Authors: Rocha de Sousa, Miguel; Pica, António Abstract: Udalov 2014 extended a collective goods problem through an Overlapping Generations Model where there is a decision regarding the type of energy use either fossil fuel versus renewable use energy Udalov introduced a politico economic equilibrium contingent on the effort or commitment on renewable energy We provide his framework but further extended it, by using an eta parameter which provides intergenerational concern among different generations, old versus youngsters We depart from non existent Udalov non concern of intergenerational generations, and extend it to use a parameter eta which reflects this concern We further provide a game, in the sense of game theory, where the politico economic equilibrium is contingent on the intergenerational concern, which reflects strategic interaction among youngsters and old people Some politico economic results at hand As higher intergenerational concern eta parameter a tribute to Stern’s 2004 report the faster the pace of recuperation of a global common good the lower level of pollution and politico economic equilibria recovers the fastest ( the investment in renewable energy Thu, 20 Jul 2023 23:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37128 2023-07-20T23:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37125 Title: Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem Authors: Rocha de Sousa, Miguel; Duarte, Vanessa Abstract: We provide the notion of Kantian equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium, and try to recover the efficiency of Pareto allocations within public goods (global commons) and external effects (like pollution) Nash 1950 a,b) provided the first solution to a non zero sum non cooperative game through a fixed point theorem Nevertheless, market efficiency is not recovered when there are either externalities (like pollution, or the global common problems), or common public goods Ostrom 1989 provided a solution in small numbers through cooperation in small lake ponds and lobsters aquaculture production and local water provision Roemer 1992 studied theories of distributive justice and came forth with a solution to global commons problem of environment and pollution ( 2019 Nevertheless, Roemer’s solution, while solving the global commons incentive problem, by thinking out of the box, and providing a new framework provides a too much collective solution We provide instead a communitarian solution, inspired by Christian ethics, namely Economics of Francis, Laudatio si which also recovers the global incentive problem, but provides a different politico economic perspective. Sun, 16 Jul 2023 23:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37125 2023-07-16T23:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37124 Title: Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem Authors: Rocha de Sousa, Miguel; Duarte, Vanessa Abstract: We provide the notion of Kantian equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium, a try to recover the efficiency of Pareto allocations within public goods (global commons) and external effects (like pollution). Nash (1950a,b) provided the first solution to a non zero-sum non-cooperative game through a fixed point theorem. Nevertheless, market efficiency is not recovered when there are either externalities (like pollution, or the global common problems and goods), or common public goods. Ostrom (1989) provided a solution in small numbers through cooperation in small lake ponds and lobsters aquaculture production and local water provision. Roemer (1992) studied theories of distributive justice and came forth with a solution to global commons problem of environment and pollution (Roemer, 2019). Nevertheless, Roemer’s solution, while solving the global commons incentive problem, by thinking out of the box, and providing a new framework provides a too much collective solution. We provide instead a communitarian solution, inspired Christian ethics, namely Economy of Francis, Laudation si, which also recovers the global incentive problem, but provides a different politico economic perspective. Wed, 19 Jul 2023 23:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37124 2023-07-19T23:00:00Z